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Codification of Law in Europe
and the Codification Movement
in the Middle of the Nineteenth
Century in the United Statest
WIENCZYSLAW J. WAGNER*
1. The Law in Civil and Common Law Countriex
It seems undeniable that civil law lends itself more
readily to codification than does common law. This fact
may well be understood if we consider the historical ele-
ments which contributed to the formation of the "common
law system" and the "civil law system."' Development
of this statement would exceed the scope of the present
observations. Therefore, only the most important of these
elements can be mentioned.
Common law proceeds from case to case and relies mainly
upon experience. Common law lawyers do not believe in
establishing principles based on abstract reasoning, un-
checked by their application to actual practical situations.
It is conservative, based as it is on -tradition. It is adverse
to quick and frequent changes and is indifferent to de-
t In a condensed form, the remarks contained in this article served as a lecture
which the author, vice-president of the American Foreign Law Association.
Chicago Branch, delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association in Chicago
in 1954.
*The author is an assistant professor at University of Notre Dame College ot
Law. He received an LL.M., University of Warsaw, 1939; Dr. en Droit, University
of Paris, 1947; J.D. and LL.M., Northwestern University, 1953. He taught in the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Fordham University and was a teaching
fellow at Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Of course, it would be a gross mistake to assume that in the various civil
law jurisdictions the systems of laws are as similar to each other as in various
common law jurisdictions; in fact, there are as many systems of law in civil law
countries, as numerous are the jurisdictions. The general term "the civil law
system" means only the similar approach to legal questions, the common method
of reasoning, establishing legal principles and interpretation, which are the same
in the civil law countries.
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ductive logic as such. Inconsistent rules are applied in
similar situations on the basis of distinctions which classify
the cases as arising either from one or from another legal
relation or branch of law, for example, either the law of
contracts or property. The fact that a different result is
reached in a chattel mortgage case than in a conditional
sale case is not disturbing to a common law lawyer. His-
torical reasons account for this situation. Often, the com-
mon law approach is highly technical, resorting to pure
fictions2 in order to accomplish results which are socially
desirable. Even when political, social and economic changes
completely transform the structure of the society, it often
takes years for the common law to -accommodate itself to
the new circumstances and relinquish obsolete rules and
procedures.
The civil law method is deductive rather than inductive.
The whole system of law is permeated with some general
principles which are to be applied in various situations,
in all fields of law. From these broad principles detailed
rules to be applied in specific situations are to be deduced.
Civil lawyers consider the legal system as one coherent
and logical whole; the different branches of law are inter-
related, consequently, their principles cannot be applied
properly if taken separately2 The law should be quickly
adjusted by legislation operating prospectively to any
change in the society; laws which no longer conform to
the current needs lose all grounds for existing; cersante
ratione legir cerrat lex ipxra. The law is an existing, com-
plete system irrespective of any litigation which may arise.
The development of these two different approaches to
law quite naturally paralleled the development of the im-
portance of the various branches of the legal profession
and their influence upon the formation of law in the com-
mon law and civil law countries. In civil law the progress
of legal thought centered about the universities where
famous law professors established their methods of under-
2. Fine and common recovery may serve as outstanding examples.
3. These generalizations need qualifications for which there is no space in
these short observations.
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standing, interprct ig, and creating the law. The law
professor is in Europe the highest priest in the temple of
law; his authority is ,inivcrsally recognized and the courts
submit to his superiority. Many a case has been decided,
in fact, not by judges but by professors, because of the
procedure of "transmission of the docket," according to
which courts at one tine sent the records of difficult cases
to law professors and asked them for opinions.' Legal
arguments are based, in civil law countries, on treatises by
legal scholars rather than on judicial precedents, although
the latter are gaining an ever-increasing importance. The
fact that not a single practicing lawyer was appointed as
a member of the commission which drafted the German
Civil Code may be a good illustration of the statement
that legal theory is in far higher esteem in civil law than
is legal practice.
In the traditional common law system the law is to a
great extent judge-made and based on custom. Its rules
are formulated only in the face of an actual situation which
arises before the court. In deciding a case the judge will
consult voluminous law reports, digests and citators in
order to find a precedent which covers the legal issue in-
volved. He will discuss the judicial "authorities," com-
pare them, analyze and distinguish them, and, if his prob-
lem is one of "first impression," he will make the law him-
self. Outside of the judicial process there is hardly any
law, since the law is a prediction of what will be the de-
cision of the judge in a given situation.
Of course, these traditional common law ideas under-
went changes. Story said:'
In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be conteded that
the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most,
only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves
laws .... Tle laws of a state are more usually understood to
mean the roles and enactments promulgated by the-legislative
authority thereof, or long established local customs having the
force of laws.
4. Rheinstein, Law la,tilie.1 and Law Schoolr: J1 Compariroll oJ Legal Educa-
hilt in the United ,8/a/.r ,tid Germany, [19381 WIS. L. REV. 5.
5. Swift v. T"Vsoll, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.), 1, 18 (1842).
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Legal theory becomes more important from day to day,
and as a result, some authors of treatises were able to gain
wide recognition, not only in the field of legal education,
but also in the everyday practice of the courts. The judges
no longer hesitate to cite Williston on contracts or Wigmore
on evidence for the corroboration of their opinions. In
some rare instances the court will even ask some disting-
uished legal scholar for an opinion helpful in deciding an
important case.6 In quite a few instances the common
and the civil law move slowly toward each other; however,
the basic difference in the approach to legal problems
persists. In common law the judge is still the undisputed
leader in the legal profession and the most important
person in shaping the law.
Another important element which has a bearing on the
role of the courts in the making of the law is the doctrine
of separation of powers. In civil law countries the theories
of Montesquieu, enunciated two centuries ago, were in-
strumental in settling the principle that the courts are to
apply the law and not to make it. This principle' was
the basis of Article 5 of the French Civil Code which
prohibits the judges from deciding cases by way of en-
unciating general principles and rules.8 Until 1837 the
liberty of the courts to disregard any judicial precedent
was pushed to the extreme, with lower courts not obliged
to follow the Cour de Camation" even in the very cases
which were remanded to them. After the reform the lower
6. "On the question of whether the contract provision against ass;gnment
by the purchaser is void as a restraint on alienation our investigation proved
the correctness of the statement . . . that the law on the question is not clear.
We invited Professor Edwin G. Goddard of the law faculty of the University of
Michigan to file brief amicus curiae. We have been aided by his excellent brief,
as we gratefully acknowledge." Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W.
735 (1932).
7. The judge "should not share the legislative power . . . the judge would
become legislator if he could, by laying down regulations, pass upon questions
which are submitted to his tribunal. A judgment binds only the parties between
whom it is pronounced . . . the powers are regulated; no one can transgress their
limits." PORTALIS REASONS FOR THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (1803), 19.
(Translated by the author.)
8. "It is forbidden to judges to pronounce by way of general and regulatory
ordinance, upon the causes brought before them." BARRETT, THE CODE
NAPOLEON (1811).
9. Supreme Court of France which passes only on questions of law.
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courts were bound by the Cour de Camation only after a
second remanding of the case, decided at a joint session
of all the Chambers of the Cour and only in the case
which was passed upon.
In England there was no separation of powers and for
many centuries in the history of the country, various
organs of the state exercised all three governmental func-
tions. There was never any clearly distinguishable border-
line between the duties of the courts, the Privy Council
and the Parliament, even when these bodies became de-
finitely separated. The Parliament acted as a court of
justice,"0 and the courts were virtually the makers of the
law. Even today the House of Lords remains the highest
judicial tribunal.
It would require a long discussion to examine to what
extent the doctrine of separation of powers has been ac-
cepted in United States constitutional theory. Perhaps
the best conclusion is that the doctrine was never com-
pletely accepted, and in its application may best be de-
scribed as a system of checks and balances.1 At any
rate, while it is no longer disputed today in England that
Parliament has the primary role in law-making, the tra-
ditional approach seems to be dominant in the United
States even now.
The above conclusions may explain to some extent the
fact that the European continent was better prepared in
the nineteenth century for the codification of its laws than
were the common law jurisdictions. However, the diffi-
culties in codifying the law of civil law countries should
not be underestimated. As a matter of fact, in some re-
spects the situation on the continent in the eighteenth
century was rather similar to that in England. In mostjurisdictions the basis of the legal system was custom,
which, together with Roman law, constituted the law of
the country. The northern part of France could-be divided-
into 60 jurisdictions, each of which had its own customs
10. For details, see MC ILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT
(1900).
11. Id. at 385.
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called coutume generale. Local customs, coutume locale,
were applicable to smaller areas, their number amounting
to 300.12 Thus, the situation seemed to be not less intri-
cate than in England, where customs were the basis of the
judge-made law," although it may be asserted that before
receiving judicial sanction customs in England could be
considered as a basis for human behavior and that the role
of the judges in the formation of common law was more
important than repeated acts of the population."
On the other hand the fourteen French Parlemenr,
which were mainly courts of justice but also exercised other
governmental functions, issued arrelt de reglement,"5 which
declared what rules of law would be applied in deciding
cases which might arise in the future." Thus, state institu-
tions which were vested with mixed powers were known in
France as well as in England.
These facts did not preclude France from taking the
lead in the codification movement which conquered all
continental Europe and swept the world in the course of
the nineteenth century.
2. Codification in Nineteenth Century Europe
The need for a certain and uniform system of law was
so strongly felt in the eighteenth century in France that it
resulted often in an exaggeration of the importance and
dignity of written law. Rousseau thought that a statute
"is the expression of the general will dealing with a general
problem, and . . . it has a limitless power to command,
can-never be unjust, and should obtain an unconditional
12. Deak and Rheinstein, The Development oJ French and German Law, 24
GEO. L. J., 651, 554 (1936).
13. "Tihe law of England continued to grow 'by a steady flow of judicial
decisions which worked the customary rules into legal principles." Repp, The
Field Codification Concept, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS
(1949), 17, 22.
14. "Today we recognize that the so-called custom is a custom of judicial
decision, not a custom of popular action." Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 406 (1908).
15. These arretr were not supposed to change the existing law. Deak and
Rheinstein, The Development oJ Franch and German Law, 24 GEO. L.J. 551,
554 (1936).
16. The power of the Parlementr to issue such arre.r was expressly withheld
in 1790. Samuel, Codification oJ Law, 5 U. OF TORONTO L. REV. 148, 149
(1943).
CODIFICATION OF LAW
and unlimited obedience.""7 These assertions can easily be
recognized as nonsensical, but their utterance should be
understood merely as a cry for escape from the legal pre-
dicament of pre-revolutionary France. The diversity of
the laws in the country and the ensuing confusion was for
centuries a matter of general concern. Some progress in
the direction of assuring a degree of certainty in law was
achieved by a compilation of customs, a work ordered by
the king and finished in the second half of the sixteenth
century. Some efforts toward codification were made by
Colbert a century later but did not effect satisfactory
results. Until the Great French Revolution, royal ordinan-
ces had the most important unifying effect on the French
legal system. The country still had to wait more than a
century after Colbert for codification of its laws.
To be sure, France was not the first modern country to
codify its laws. In the middle of the eighteenth century
Frederick the Great of Prussia decided to grant his country
a code, and the work on this was completed in 1794. How-
ever, the Code was a restatement of the existing rules of
law based on customs and Roman law rather than a mod-
ern codification, had many shortcomings and did not serve
as a model for any future legal reform.
If the Prussian Code is often described as the first in
the civil law system, it is only because it is doubtful whether
the Scandinavian states can be classified as civil law coun-
tries. Maybe they should rather be considered as forming
a separate group. It should be mentioned, however, that
the first civil code in Scandinavia, that of Denmark, dates
back to 1683; the Norwegian code was enacted in 1688,
and the Swedish one followed in 1736. Criminal law was
codified in Scandinavia in the nineteenth century.
Some parts of the old Danish code are still in force to-
day. In spite of its imperfections, it may be considered as
meriting the honorable place of the first code in the modern
sense of the word. 17
17. DUGUIT, LANN IN TIlE MODERN STATE (1919), 68.
17a. Data on the Scandianiavian codes is taken from ORFIELD, THE
;ROWTII OF SCANDINAVIAN LAW (1953), xv, 14-16, 165-170, 254-256.
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France was second in introducing a code system, but
was first in performing this work in so outstanding a man-
ner as to assure the victory of codification in all civil law
jurisdictions.
A commission of codification consisting of four persons
was appointed by Napoleon in 1800, and in an extremely
short period of time (four months), prepared a draft civil
code. The draft was submitted to the Cour de Car.ration
and the appellate courts for comments18 and, after some
amendments, was submitted to the legislature. Becoming
effective in 1804, the Code was a tremendous success. It
was progressive, abolished the remnants of feudal institu-
tions," simplified and unified the legal system, made the
law clear by avoiding minute details, left some discretion
to the judges, and was flexible and adaptable to changing
circumstances. However, it was not revolutionary. It took
into account the historical background of many legal rules,
and, although repealing the ancient law irr matters. covered
by it, it expressly authorized the application of local custo-
. ary law in some'situations.
The influence of the Code was tremendous. In addition
to the French Empire, Belgium, as well as some German
states such as Baden adopted it in full and a large portion
of 3* was enacted in Central Poland under; Russian domina-
tion. For nearly three quarters of a century it was in force
in a country whose historical and cultural background was
completely different from that of France, namely, Egypt.0
It served as a model in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece,21 Guatemala, Haiti, Holland,2 2
Honduras, Italy,23 Louisiana, Luxemburg, Mexico, Monte-
18. Deak and Rheinstein, The Development oJ French and German Law, 24
GEO. L.J. 551, 556 (1936).
19. Amos, The Code Napoleon and the Modern World, 10 J. COMP. LEG.
& INT'L L., 3d, 222 (1928).
20. From 1875 to 1949 when a New Egyptian civil code became effective
21. A new Greek civil code, enacted in February, 1946, was abrogated a few
weeks later.
22. In the Netherlands the codification of the law was ordered by the Con-
stitution of 1798, but the work was very slow and finally the French Civil Code
was taken as a model. Fontein, J Century oJ Codification in Holland, 21 J. COMP.
LEG. & INT'L L., 3d, 83 (1939).
23. Italy recently enacted new codes; the first part of the civil code took
effect in 1939.
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negro, Peru, Portugal, Quebec, Rumania, Salvador, San
Domingo, Spain, Urguguay, and Venezuela.
In a short span of time other French codes followed the
civil one: the Code of Civil Procedure in 1807, of Com-
merce in 1808, and the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1811.
In Austria where preparatory studies lasted for about a
century, a civil code went into effect in 1811. It is interest-
ing to note that, although enacted by a conservative govern-
ment, its jurisprudential basis was in quite a few instances
similar to those of the post-revolutionary French Civil
Code."4
Other states followed. Saxony adopted its civil code in
1863. and the French Code largely influenced the Italian
(1865) and the Spanish (1889) codes.
The end of the century brought about a unified civil
code for all of Germany; it was adopted in 1896 and became
effective in 1900. A need for uniform laws has been felt
in the several German states for quite some time, and as a
result, the first steps were achieved in the middle of the
nineteenth century. The Commercial Code of 1861 was
adopted by all states. With the progress of German unifi-
cation in 1871 the federal government was able to center
its attention on law reform.' The Criminal Code of 1871
was followed by the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure
of 1877 and the Commercial Code of 1897.25
The process of codification in Europe was not completed
by the end of the nineteenth century and therefore con-
tinued into the twentieth . The most famous piece of work
was the Swiss Civil Code of 1907 (in force since 1912),
which followed the enactment of the Swiss Code of Obli-
gations.
In England, as has been mentioned before, the atmos-
phere of the traditional common law was not favorable to
codification. "Fundamental law" which was nothing else
than a version of natural law embodied to a great extent
24. Samuel, Codification oJLaw,, 5 U. OF TORONTO L. REV. 148, 152 (1943).
25. Deak and Rheinstein, The Development oJ French and German Law, 24
GEO. L.J. 551, 570-575 (1936).
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in customs was believed to exist irrespective of any legisla-
tive enactments, to be binding on the king, the courts,
and the whole society," and to to best discoverable by the
courts. The importance and authority of legislation began
to increase in the seventeenth century and resulted in a
victory of the written over the unwritten law in the nine-
teenth century. Even much earlier some statutes of un-
usual importance, such as the statutes De Donis and of
Uses, virtually reshaped the law in some branches of human
relations. Early projects to codify the law were advanced:
first, in the first part of the sixteenth century (Henry VIII);
second, in 1614 by Bacon. The trend toward codification
was accentuated at the end of the eighteenth century,
together with a similar phenomenon on the continent.
The most famous, although not the wisest representative
of this current of thought, was Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832). He propagated the theory of the necessity for codi-
fication but did not try to draft any code himself. He dis-
regarded the ever changing circumstances and progress in
human life and developed a concept of legislative enact-
ments which was too rigid and inflexible. He rejected
the stimulating idea of the law of nature, criticized Black-
stone and denounced common law as counterfeit and
arbitrarily made by the judges,27 but he himself was unable
to set up anything to replace the ideals which he discarded.
He was considered by some "a curious man, with his
complete neglect of all nobler elements of thought and
feeling. ' '28
Austin (1790-1859) was next to gain fame as an advocate
of the reform by statutory. enactment of laws regulating
human relations. However, codification was never achieved
in England. After the plan of Lord Westbury (1860-1863)
failed the country followed the course of increasing the
certainty of law by way of gradual statutory enactments,
26. MC ILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAIENT (1900), 51 ff.
27. Repp, The Field Codification Concept, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENAiY ESSAYS (1949), 17, 52 ff.
28. Words of Professor Saintsbury, cited hy Gruhut, English Law and the
History oJ Continental Legislation, 20 J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L L., 3d, 165,
173 (1938).
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prescribing selccted segments of law. Among the first and
most important achevcnients, the Bills of Exchange Act
(1882) and the Sale o (Goods Act (1894) should be mention-
ed.
3. The Si/ua/wt i,, I e th, n i/ed State'
To what extent were these ideas reflected in the legal
thought of the United States?
The states of the Union, except for Louisiana, inherited
the English common law system, with all of its virtues and
and vices. Although some of the obsolete feudal rules were
quickly discarded, the basic approach to the problems of
law followed the traditional common law philosophy. For
quite a number of years, however, it seemed that the
situation here might become completely different. The
early American trend toward legal reform had as its basis
the easily understandable reluctance to follow English
example after national independence from the Crown was
achieved. The lack of a system of colonial reports" and
the high prestige of the legislatures of the liberated colonies
as the only representative organ of the people, protecting
their rights and striving towards their freedom,"0 were im-
portant elements which could shift the point of gravity in
the shaping of law from the courts to the legislature. Many
voices were heard to say that the new nation should make
a completely new legal start;"1 and hopes were expressed
that the legislatures would work out the codification of
American law."2 Of course, the development abroad, the
writings of Bentham, and, above all, the French example
and the success of its codes must have exerted an influence
upon the minds of the American legal scholars of the
nineteenth century. Moreover, the powerful idea of natural
law, in its eighteenth century form, dominated well into
the second half of the nineteenth century in the United
States and was understood as encouraging legislative en-
29. POUND, TIIP FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), 9.
30. 1 IURST, TI IF, GROWTI I OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
(1950), 24.
31. POUND, TIlEF FORMNATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), 12.
32. Id. at 38.
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actments of principles, which would be stable but adapt-
able to various circumstances and discoverable by human
reason. Since the most outstanding result of the influence
of natural law in America was the Declaration of Inde-
pendence,"3 it could be expected that it would go far in
this direction of establishing a system of written law.
The trend toward codification in the United States found
its highest expression in the middle of the nineteenth
century in the works and achievements of the outstanding
legal scholar David Dudley Field (1805-1894), who was on
the very verge of success in transforming the American
legal system into a codified one.
Field was not the first great American codifier of law,
but his predecessor worked under much more favorable
conditions: Edward Livingston (1764-1836), of New York,
was the important figure in the codification of Louisiana
law. It is self-evident that it was more natural for Louisi-
ana, a civil law jurisdiction, to follow the French example
than forthe common law jurisdictions of the Union. The
first Louisiana Civil Code, that of 1808, was based mainly
on French law but incorporated some Spanish principles
as well. In 1822 a commission was established by the
legislature in order to bring about further progress in the
codification of Louisiana law. Livingston became its mov-
ing spirit. A new civil code was published in 1824 and took
effect the following year. The Code of Practice was enacted
in 1825. Codification of other branches of the law met
with more difficulties. The Code of Commerce, drafted in
1823, was not adopted. The same was the fate of Living-
ston's Code of Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Code
of 1824. The general opinion is that it was an outstanding
piece of work but too advanced for its times. 4
Even in the American common law jurisdictions, Field was
33. "[Tihe ... natural law ... became embodied . . . in the Declaration of
Independence and is behind our bills of rights. But this natural law is . . . a . . .
recourse to constructive ideals, drawn from reason and used as agencies of crea-
tive change, and . . resort to a presumption that legal precepts which obtain
g1enerall over the civilized world are declaratory of reason." POUND, THE
RAIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), 17-18.
34. Lobingier. The French-American Codes, 19 VA. L. REV. 351 (1932).
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not the first either to conceive the idea of codification or
to put this idea into practice. The earliest attempt to
enact a kind of code was made in Massachusetts in the
first half of the seventeenth century. A law revision com-
mittee was appointed in 1635, and had as its result the
Book oJ the General Laws and Libertie" Concerning the
Inhabitants ofthe ilaxxachuxeltt, 1648." The Book was an
advanced piece of work of that period and exerted a strong
influence on other sister colonies. However, it was not a
codification in the modern meaning of the word, and should
rather be characterized as a restatement, although quite
a few changes in the existing system of law were brought
about by it.
Field was the first common law lawyer who approached
the problem of codification both from the point of view
of a profound theorist and a successful, experienced prac-
titioner. He was. not content with the mere advancement
of his ideas but devoted his life to the painstaking task of
drafting codes in the various fields of law3" and succeeded
in having his ideas at least partially executed.
Following some demands to attempt to codify the law,
two leading Eastern states decided slightly before the
middle of the century to determine whether the task were
feasible. Massachusetts was first. In 1835 commissioners
were appointed by the legislature in order to report on the
practicability of codification. A year later a report was
presented by the commissioners, among whom were such
outstanding persons as Story and Greenleaf; their con-
clusion was that codification should be undertaken."
However, the attitude of the legislature changed. The
opponents of codification won the battle, and consequently
the whole project was abandoned.
35. Riesenfeld, Law-14akino and Legidative Precedent in American Legal
Hiitory, 33 MINN. L. REV. 103 (1949).
36. Besides long studies on codification of internal law, Field devoted a great
deal of time to the promotion of the idea of codification of international law,
and drafted an international law code. His leading thesis was that war should
be prevented. Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 17, 43.
37. Pound, David Dudley Field: An ,pprairal, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 3, 9.
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It may be that the same result, or rather a lack of any
result, would have been the fate of New York, but for the
strong personality of Field who caused rather fruitful
developments.
The task was not easy, since most of the post-revoluton-
ary enthusiasm for a new purely American legal system
was gone, and since the old English common law approach
to the question of statute and judge-made law began to
gain ground considerably. The ideas of the historical school
penetrated from Europe into the United States and found
their most eloquent representative in the person of James
Coolidge Carter. The fighters against codification asserted
that to keep abreast of the development of the society,
law must be born spontaneously following the usages of
the people and must be declared to be binding by the
courts. According to Carter no attempts at codification
should be undertaken.38
But Field was not easily to be excluded from the -con-
troversy. He realized the various shortcomings of the un-
stable judge-made system of laws in which everything is
uncertain, the rules are often not only completely'unknown
to laymen, but hardly ascertainable by men trained in
the legal profession. The most important purpose of the
proposed reform was to make the law certain, understand-
able and accessible to the average man, to render the
administration of justice speedier and less expensive,
through simplification of the procedure and to abolish
permanently obsolete remnants of antiquated doctrines and
illogical rules. Nothing could be more true than the in-
scription on Field's tomb: "He devoted his life to the re-
form of the law . . . To bring justice within the reach of
all men.""s
The whole work and life of Field were imbued with a
profound conviction of the rightness of his ideas and a
deep faith that sooner or later they must win in order to
serve the community well, but his concept was far from
38. Id. at 6-7.
39. Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 17.
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being revolutionary. He did not intend to discard the
whole tradition and achievements of the common law and
create a completely new legal system, unconnected with the
realities of society in which it was to be in force and founded
merely upon purely theoretical speculations. He believed
in the spirit of the common law which he considered to be
based upon natural justice, but he was convinced that this
common law should be thoroughly revised and codified,
so as to constitute a coherent and logical whole. 0  In
short, his approach to codification was historical. Field
was well acquainted with the French Civil Code and its
"new legal start" idea, and his knowledge of that Code
helped him in his own codification work;" but it seems
that only Field's approach could have had any chance
for success in his time and community.
The first effort to bring some order to the legal uncertain-
ty and chaos in the state of New York was directed toward
a systematic compilation and arrangements of statutes.
In 1828 the New York Revised Statutes appeared and
served as a model for many other states. 2 This was, of
course, far from the idea of codification. Largely through
the efforts of Field" the New York Constitution of 1847
ordered the appointment of a commission to codify the law.
The first commission which was established had the task
of reforming civil procedure, and Field, who was one of its
members, became its spiritual leader. The result of the
work was the "Field Code of Civil Procedure" which was
adopted and was in force in New York from 1848 to 1877.
Its influence upon the procedural reform in the sister states
was tremendous. The fact that it was adopted or served
as a model in not less than thirty of the United States
jurisdictions proves the leading role of New York in the
development of American law, as well as the value of the
Code itself.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Lobingier, The MIodern Expansion o the Roman Law, 6 U. OF CIN. L.
REV. 152 (1932).
42. Goodrich, Retaternent and Codificaiion, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 241, 253.
43. Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 3, 19.
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Field understood well what should be the role of a code.
He avoided surcharging it with scores of details and limited
its provisions to the extablishment of general principles,
leaving the details to be settled by practice and judicial
decision. His Code of Civil Procedure had less than four
hundred sections.44 In this approach the French influence
was evident, but the proper way of drafting codes was not
readily understood everywhere. The first continetal code,
the Civil Code of Prussia, was intended to be a complete
set of answers to any legal questions which might arise.
Legal rules were to be provided with all possible details,
and the judge was not to be granted any scope of discretion
whatsoever. In case of any doubt as to the interpretation
of the provisions of the code, the judges were directed to
ask for instructions from a royal commission whose an-
swers were binding.
The approach of the French codifiers was directly op-
posed to the absurd ideas of the Prussian legislators. The
spirit which guided the drafters of the French codes is
well explained in the Reaxonsjor the Civil Code, written by
Portalis.4" "The purpose of the statute," we read in the
Reasrons, "is to regulate causes which arise most frequently.
Accidents, unexpected and extraordinary cases cannot be
the subject matter of a statute." This is a far-reaching
proposition which delimits the proper scope of legislative
enactments. But even in matters which should be dealt
with by the legislator, according to Portalis, "it is impossible
to regulate everything by strict rules. It is a wise prediction
to realize that it is not possible to foresee everything."
Therefore, the judge should be granted a wide discretion:
"The possibility of supplementing the law by natural
truths and the right directions of common sense should be
left to the judges. Nothing could be more childish than
to endeavor to take necessary steps in order to provide
the judges with strict rules . . . ." The theory of natural
44. Id. at 10.
45. Samuel, Codification o( Law, 5 U. OF TORONTO L. REV. 148, 153,
n. 8 (1943).
46. CIVIL CODE (1803), 18-19.
CODIFICATION OF LAW
law finds its further expression in the next observation:
"When the statute is silent, natural reason is still speaking."
The broad powers of the judge are emphasized in quite a
number of passages: "The exercise of the power to judge
is not always directed by formal prescriptions. There are
also maxims, usages, examples, opinions of textwriters."
How far this approach differs from the picture of the civil
law codification which some of the common law lawyers
have! The next observation of Portalis could well be voiced
by any common law lawyer opposing the idea of codifica-
tion: "[T]he right approach, consisting in the knowledge
of the spirit of laws, is superior to the knowledge of the
laws themselves. ' ' 7
It is sufficient to become acquainted with these few ex-
cerpts from the Reaxonxjor the Code to understand its flexi-
bility and the fact that with a few changes it is still in force
today, in spite of the tremendous changes of circumstances
of life, technical progress and transformation of political
and social ideas in the last century and a half. Only re-
cently a commission was appointed to overhaul the Code"
and modernize it. It might even be asserted that the Code
was too terse and left too many gaps to be filled by custom,
textwriters, and judicial decision. The whole law of torts,
for example, is covered by five short sections of the Code.
Many subsequent codifiers of continental law imitated
the French technique. They endeavored to include whole
fields of law in as few provisions as possible. However,
since every extreme is bad, some voices were raised against
this tendency.'
The virtues of the Field Code of Civil Procedure were not
appreciated in New York. It was in force for only about
thirty years. In 1876-1880 a new procedural code (Throop
47. These excerpts were freely translated by the author.
48. See, for example, Morandiere, The Rejorm oJ the French Civil Code, 97
U. OF PA. L. REV. 1 (1948); Pascal, I Report on the French Civil Code Revision
Project, 11 LA. L. REV. 261 (1951).
49. "The Swiss Federal Code on Obligations is . . . absolutely defective pre-
cisely because of its laconicism. Innumerable are the questions which it raises
only to leave them unanswered." Roguin, The Form oJ the Law, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 445, 450 (1933).
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Code) replaced the Field Code. The new law was compli-
cated, unclear, and extremely detailed. Its 3,356 original
sections were supplemented by additional ones in 1890 and
1897, the total number amounting to 3,441." The Code
finally included about 50,000 provisions, in about 2,000
pages.5"
It is unfortunate that in the period in which so much
was expected from the legislature, it revealed many short-
comings. One of the most serious of these was the poor
technique of drafting legislative enactments. The Throop
Code was by no means an exception in the nineteenth-
century United States. It is paradoxical that, whereas on
the European continent legislative enactments in the nine-
teenth century were couched in general terms and left a
wide power of interpretation and discretion to the judge,
in common law jurisdictions, where the prestige and the
law-making role of the judge are much greater, the legisla-
tures too often followed the Prtussian example of 1794 and
attempted to make the courts an automat in the applica-
tion of detailed rules to any situation which. might arise.
If we add some other defects of the drafting technique,
such as lengthy senftences, complicated style, confusing
language, inconsistent provisions, many repetitions, lack
of a thorough preparation of the enactments and the re-
sulting necessity of frequent amendments, we can easily
see that the very technique used in the nineteenth century
American statutes was one of the reasons why the fight
for supremacy between the legislatures and the courts was
won by the judiciary. 3
50. A new code of civil procedure (The New York Civil Practice Act) replaced
the Thropp Code in 1920. Soie mistakes were corrected, but many still remain.
"An elderly member of the New York Bar has been quoted as opposed to re-
vision and simplification of New York civil practice, because it had taken him
years to master our system and its sinplification would leave him with no ad-
vantage over young lawyers. Mitchell, The Federal Rules oJ Civil Procedure,
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 73, 80.
51. Pound, Daoid Dudley Field: Jn Jppraixal, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 3, 10.
52. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
(1950), 76.
53. The twentieth century movement towards codification of procedural rules
by the supreme court of each jurisdiction was a reaction against the deficiencies
otlegislative lawmaking in procedural matters. Ibid. The most outstanding work
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Because of the opposition against Field he was not
appointed as a member of the commission to draft the codes
of substantive law. The result was the complete failure
of the commission. Field said:"
The commission failed because the men who were appointed
to it had no faith in a codification of the Common Law; and
neither appeared to understand what was meant by it nor
were competent to undertake it if they had. They thought
only of a new revision of the statute. What we wanted was
a codification of the Common Law.
The repeal of the Act appointing a Commission to Re-
form Procedure and Codify the Law in 1850 did not close
the controversy. The indefatigable activity of Field con-
tinued. In 1857 the pendulum of the legislature's favor
swung again in his direction. A new commission was ap-
pointed, and Field was one of its members. The results
of the work of the commission were presented to the legis-
lature, in the form of reports, in the years 1858-1865. The
Civil Code was completed in 1862 and was composed of
2,034 sections."
A dramatic fight for the Code ensued. It seemed that it
would be victorious, when it was approved four times by
the Assembly and twice by both houses of the legislature,
but it failed to receive the signature of governors Cornell
and Robinson, who were influenced by conservative repre-
sentatives of the bar." Had the executives' veto not been
exercised, the whole idea of codification of law might
have been victorious in the entire United States.
In spite of its defeat in New York, the Field Civil Code
was adopted in California, North Dakota, South Dakota
has been done by the Federal Supreme Court which adopted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1938 (amended in 1948). The adoption of the Federal Rules
has taken place in some states (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri,
New Mexico, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and Texas) and influenced many
others. Clark, Code Pleaditn and Practice Today, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 55, 67.
54. Repp, Te Field Codification Concept, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949). 17, 38.
55. Id. at 41.
56. Id. at 46.
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and Montana. These four states enacted all the draft
codes of Field.
In the field of criminal law the matter was less contro-
versial. The Field Penal Code of 1864 was enacted in New
York in 1887. His Code of Criminal Procedure of 1865,
however, did not win general approval in his native state,
and in 1881 another code was adoptedY Both the Penal
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of Field were
adopted in sixteen states.6" The remaining draft codes of
Field were: the Political Code (1860) and the Code of Evi-
dence (1889)."1
Georgia is a state where law is codified. In 1858, the
General Assembly of the state provided for the preparation
of a code which should embrace "the laws of Georgia,
whether derived from the common law, the Constitutions,
the statutes of the State, the decisions of the Supreme
Court, or the statutes of England of force in this State."
The code was drafted by three commissioners and adopted
in 1860. It is a very comprehensive piece of work and
consists of four parts: I. The Political and Public Organi-
zation of the State; II. The Civil Code; III. The Code of
Practice; IV. Penal Laws.
According to the report of the Committee on the Code,
the leading idea of the codifiers was :,,a
to attempt no change or alteration in any well-defined rule
of law which had received legislative sanction or judicial ex-
position, and to add no principle or policy which had received
the condemnation of the former, or was antagonistic to the
settled decisions of the latter .... In short, the great end and
aim has been to reconcile, harmonize, render consistent the body
of the law, so as to give shape and order, system and efficiency,
to the sometimes crude, and often ill-expressed, sovereign will
of the State.
57. Id. at 36.
58. Pound, David Dudley Field: ,n Apprairal, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 3, 10.
59. McFarland, Adminixtrative Law and Codification oj Statutex, DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 204, 210-211.
5 9a. The quotations are taken from the 1896 edition of the Code.
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Thus the drafters of the Code applied the historical
method of codification. Maybe the result of the work was
a restatement of the existing state of the law rather than
a codification in the full sense of this word. The Code was
revised a few times, and particularly in 1894 when new
commissioners were appointed "to codify the laws of
Georgia." The revised Code follows the general plan and
system of the original Code, but sections were re-numbered.
The Georgia Code proved to be satisfactory. However,
it did not exert much influence on the law of other states.
4. Reasronr jor the Dejeat oj Codification
It may be surprising that in the period under considera-
tion, the middle of the nineteenth century, the results of
the trend toward codification were not more fruitful, and
that at the end of the century, the legislatures became as
unpopular as the executives a century earlier.o The prob-
lem of codification was, of course, strictly connected with
the confidence in the ability and competency of the legisla-
tive branch of government, and the fate of codification, the
supreme form of legislation, was dependent upon the suc-
cess or failure of the legislature. Until the Civil War the
hegemony of the legislatures of the several states could
not be denied. 1 However, during this period they were
unable to cope adequately not only with the problem of
codification but also with the enacting of important and
good statutes as well. Outstanding students of the legisla-
tive branch of government in the first century of the Ameri-
can independence stress many instances of pressures placed
upon the legislatures by interests of particular groups,
political influences, direct corruption, greatly excessive
number of legislative enactments, abuses of special legis-
lation, surreptitious clauses inserted in bills, amending,
repealing, and supplementing legislation and attempts to
60. POUND, TIlF FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), 38.
61. Id. at 39.
62. HURST. T IIE (ROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS(1950), 39 ff.
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control the judiciary."3 These facts account for the con-
stitutional limitations on the legislative power which began
to be enacted at tbe end of the first half of the nineteenth
century.64
But the incompetence of the legislatures was not the only
factor whlich deprived them of their prestige and the con-
fidence of the picople a,;d prevented statutes and even codes
from 1 ay'ng _ 54,e wl.hich they should have had in the
American legal yste.i. E ven when good and well-pre-
pared !egslative enactments were passed, the courts
often annulled them.
The first method was I, i:.acle them completely."5 The
legislature could do what it pleased, and the courts would
follow their own way and simply forget all about the
existence of some iegislafive acts; but this was not always
possible. The strongest weapon of the courts in their fight
with the legislatures was their power of declaring the
statutes unconstitutional. The due process clause of the
United States Constitution, which is capable of different
interpretations and applicable in varied circumstances,
became a real danger to any act of the legislature.
Even when the statutes were neither ignored nor de-
clared void by the courts, the manner of their application
by the ,tges ,ten resulted in their nullification. The old
comMon tsw doctrines of construing legislative enact-
,iients, generally discarded in nineteenth century 'England,
,ere iot oily welcomned by the American courts but even
extended.
Centuries ago legislative enactments were not supposed
to bring about any chainges in the common law system.
Their purpose was to provide proper means for its admin-
istration and to prohibit practices inconsistent with its
spirit.6" Therefore, statutes were regarded mainly as
declaratory of common law. The courts made every pos-
63. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), 52 ff.
64. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
65. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
(1950), 37.
66. MC ILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT (1900) ,46.
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sible effort to construe written law in the light of the pre-
existing common law rules. 7 And, as a matter of fact,
some statutes and even American nineteenth century
"codes," enacted in some states, were compilations of judge-
made rules rather than works of codification."
Once it was admitted that some statutes clearly dero-
gated from the common law rules, judges attempted to
interpret them as narrowly as possible" in order to leave
to the common law as much ground as they possibly
could. Moreover, since the very philosophy of the com-
mon law is to reason from case to case, from one set of
detailed facts to another, it is not surprising that statutes
were regarded as setting specific and detailed rules rather
than broad principles applicable in various situations.0
However, it is amazing to note that in its full scope the
doctrine of narrow interpretations of statutes was applied
only in the United States in the nineteenth century" after
it had already been discarded in England.
The general approach of the courts to any kind of legis-
lative enactments was, of course, applied also to the codes.
Therefore, the role of the few codes which were enacted
in nineteenth century United States cannot be compared
to that of the continental codes. In Europe the code is
everything. In the exercise of their judicial discretion the
judges compare different provisions of the code involved
and of other codes; proceed by analogy; apply the general
principles of the codes, such as bonox morex and "public
order," to the most varied situations; examine the legis-
lative history of the codes; and finally, they consult the
textwriters and previous court decisions delivered after
the enactment of the code. They are reluctant to admit
that in some cases they face a gap in the law and that
they have to fill this gap themselves, even if they are ex-
67. id. at 269.
68. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
(1950), 71.
69. ILBERT, LEGISLATIVE METHODS AND FORMS (1901), 6-7.
70. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), 46 ff.
71. 'Pound, Common Law' and Lexgi.rlation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1908).
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pressly authorized to establish rules in such cases. 2  In
the absence of an authorization of the code itself, they do
not regard the code in the light of preexisting law.
In nineteenth century United States the contrary hap-
pened. In California the Field codes were given an inter-
pretation which closely assimilated their provisions to the
common law rules, although these rules were intended to
be modified or discarded. Similarly, the Field Code of
Civil Procedure of 1848 was practically nullified by the
courts.74
It may be that, just as Germany in the times of Savigny,
the United States was not yet ripe in the middle of the
nineteenth century for a codification in the modern sense
of the word. 5 But it seems that at the beginning of the
twentieth century the American system of law entered into
a new stage of development. Although the Restatements
of Law of the American Law Institute are only a private
attempt to achieve some order and certainty in the appli-
cation of common law rules, do not purport to bring about
any changes in the existing system and no not bind the
courts in the slightest degree, they succeeded in eliminat-
ing some inconsistencies in the application of law, systema-
tized it and exerted an influence on the American judges
and lawyers. 8
The functions of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws resemble more nearly real codifying work and the
success of some of its acts is a good prognosis for the future.
Its most recent achievement is the Commercial Code which
is expected to gain wide acceptance in the states.
72. SWISS CIVIL CODE, Art. I: ". . . If the Code does not furnish an ap-
plicable provision, the judge shall decide in accordance with customary law,
and failing that, according to the rule which he would establish as legislator."
73." Lawyers and judges "were taught.., by no less a jurist than John Norton
Pomeroy... [to] assume the code to be merely declaratory of what they had already
learned and knew and had practiced . . ." Pound, David Dudley Field: An Ap-
praisral, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 3, 12.
74. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1908).
75. Pound, David Dudley Field: An Apprairal, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENETENARY ESSAYS (1949), 6.
76. For details on the restatement of law see Goodrich, Restatement and
Codification, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949), 241.
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However, these matters exceed the purposes of the present
short study and should be considered separately. Let us
close with the observation that at least in the field of pro-
cedure the continental approach to reform of law by
codification is gaining approval." With the disappearance
of the distrust of the legislative branch of government in
the United States it may be hoped that codes and other
legislative enactments will play a much more, important
role in American life than they did heretofore.
77. "IT]he inexorable logic of events is approximating our procedural institu-
tions more and more to those in use on the Continent." Millar, Civil Procedurc
Rejorm in Civil Law Countrier, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS (1949), 120, 139.
